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Abstract—Cyberbullying is a problem in today’s ubiquitous
online communities. Filtering it out of online conversations has
proven a challenge, and efforts have led to the creation of many
different datasets, all offered as resources to train classifiers.
Through these datasets, we will explore the variety of definitions
of cyberbullying behaviors and the impact of these differences
on the portability of one classifier to another community. By
analyzing the similarities between datasets, we also gain insight
on the generalization power of the classifiers trained from them.
A study of ensemble models combining these classifiers will help
us understand how they interact with each other.
Index Terms—natural language processing, deep learning,
cyberbullying, cross-domain generalisation
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social interactions are commonplace today. Unfortu-
nately, with the positive benefits of bringing together people
in an unprecedented way, has come the negative impacts,
namely the spread of cyberbullying and its social toll. For
example, a recent study in Canada [1] found that 17% of 15-
to-29-year-old Internet users (or 1.1 million individuals) had
experienced cyberbullying, that the problem disproportionately
affected women (19%), low-income people (24%), and homo-
sexuals (34%), and that 20% of victims developed emotional,
psychological or mental health conditions as a result.
Although many solutions to this problem have been pro-
posed in the literature and in industry, none of them agree on
precisely what constitutes cyberbullying. For example, [2] has
found that cyberbullying can include general insults, cursing,
sexism or hate speech, defamation, sexual harassment, threats
or blackmail, and even polite support of the aggressor, directed
against a victim or their friends and family, which may occur
once or be repeated, which may or may not involve a power
imbalance between the aggressor and victim, and which may
be an intentional attack or a misunderstanding.
In this paper, we aim to explore the relationship and dis-
tinctions that exist between datasets that implement different
definitions of cyberbullying, the possibilities and limitations to
applying a system trained on one dataset to filter cyberbullying
in a new context, and to discover empirically the best way to
combine them to create a generalized cyberbullying detection
system. In line with these objectives, section II will present a
selection of datasets that each cover a subspace of the general
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space of cyberbullying. In section III, we study the similarities
in the language used in these datasets. Next, in section IV, we
train a deep-learning model on each dataset in order to study
their generalization power, before exploring different ways to
combine them into a general cyberbullying detector in section
V. In all cases, the results we obtain are thoroughly analyzed.
Finally, section VI will draw some concluding remarks.
II. DATASETS
For our research, we have selected eight datasets pertaining
to various types of behaviors that fit the general definition of
cyberbullying. Many of these datasets have labels to designate
specific types of behaviors which are either not found in other
datasets or defined in a different manner. In order to make
the datasets directly comparable, we merged all these labels
into a positive ”cyberbullying” class, opposing the much more
common negative class of messages that are not cyberbullying.
In addition, some of these datasets came divided into training
and testing sets. For the others, we randomly divided the
datasets into a 20% test set and 80% training set, which we
further divided into 80% training and 20% validation sets.
Basic statistics for all the datasets are given in table I.
A. Hate Speech and Offensive Language
This dataset1 was collected by [3] by searching Twitter
for tweets containing hate speech terms from the lexicon
Hatebase.org. Out of the 85.4 million tweets gathered, 25,000
tweets were randomly selected and annotated by three or more
annotator to one of three labels: if it contains hate speech,
if it features offensive language without hate speech, or if it
contains neither hate speech nor offensive language. A tweet’s
final label was the majority decision, and tweets for which no
majority decision existed were filtered out. This gave them a
corpus of 4,163 tweets that do not contain hate speech nor
offensive language, 19,190 that contain offensive language,
and 1,430 that are considered hate speech, making it the only
corpus in our study imbalanced in favor of the positive class.
B. Racism and Sexism
The authors of [4] designed a list of slurs and terms
identifying religious, sexual, gender, and ethnic minorities.
They then sampled Twitter for tweets using these words, and
refined their list based on the results. They manually annotated
1https://github.com/t-davidson/hate-speech-and-offensive-language
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each sampled tweet as sexist, racist, or neither, and had an
expert review their annotations in order to mitigate possible
bias. We used a version of their dataset2made available by [5].
C. Bullying
This dataset was gathered by the authors of [6] from
the question-answering (QA) platform Formspring. They ran-
domly selected 50 users from the 18,554 users of the platform,
each with between 1 and 1,000 QA pairs on the site. Each pair
was labeled by three annotators who were asked to judge if
it contains cyberbullying and, if so, to identify which words
or phrases were the reason. This created a labeled dataset of
12,773 QA pairs3. We follow the work of [5] and concatenate
the question and answer into as single message.
D. Insults in social commentary
This Kaggle competition dataset [7] was gathered from an
unspecified social networking site, and the comments it is
comprised of were labeled as insulting or not. However, this
dataset applies a narrower definition and only labels positive
messages if they are obviously insulting to a specific member
of the on-going conversation. Messages that insult celebrities
and public figures, messages that include insults and racial
slurs not directed at a specific person, and subtle insults, are
all counted as negative-class messages.
E. Hate Speech
This dataset is composed of messages scraped from the
white-supremacist internet forum Stormfront by the authors of
[8]. The messages were labeled into one of four classes. The
”hate” class is for messages that are (i) deliberate attack (ii)
directed towards a specific group of people (iii) and motivated
by aspects of the group’s identity. This definition is a different
from traditional hate speech: for example using a racial slur
in an offhand manner and without deliberately attacking that
racial group is not considered a hate message. The ”relation”
class is for messages that do not fit in the hate class by them-
selves, but do when read within the context of the conversation
in which they appear. The ”skip” class contains non-English
messages and gibberish. Finally, the ”non-hate” class is for all
messages that do not fit the other three categories. The original
dataset4 is composed of 9,507 non-hate messages, 1,196 hate
messages, 168 relation messages, and 73 skip messages. We
redefined the hate class as our positive class and the others as
our negative class. The rationale for including relation in the
negative class is that most cyberbullying detection systems
work on a line-by-line basis and will mark such messages
without context as acceptable.
F. Toxic comment classification
The second Kaggle dataset [9] was gathered from Wikipedia
talk pages comments. Each comment was annotated with six
different labels: toxic, severely toxic, obscene, threat, insult,
2https://github.com/sweta20/Detecting-Cyberbullying-Across-SMPs
3www.kaggle.com/swetaagrawal/formspring-data-for-cyberbullying-detection
4https://github.com/aitor-garcia-p/hate-speech-dataset
and identity hate; however the annotation procedure is not
described. Unlike the previous datasets, each comment can
be tagged with multiple labels. The dataset contains 21,384
comments labeled as toxic, 1,962 as severely toxic, 12,140 as
obscene, 689 as threats, 11,304 as insults, and 2,117 as identity
hate. For our work, we assign a comment to our positive class
if it contains any one or more of these labels.
G. Unintended bias in toxicity classification
This dataset, also from Kaggle [10], was obtained from
a news website comment filter system called Civil Com-
ments. Its 1,999,514 comments were labeled by three to ten
crowd-sourced annotators on average (and sometimes up to a
thousand annotators) into six labels: severe toxicity, obscene,
threat, insult, identity attack, and sexual explicit. Any and all
labels chosen by half or more of annotators was applied to the
comment. Once again, we consider a comment as belonging
to the positive class if any of the labels was applied to it.
H. Personal attacks and harassment
The final dataset we selected for our study was also con-
structed from Wikipedia talk page comments. The authors of
[11] randomly sampled the 63 million talk-page comments
posted between 2004 and 2015. They added comments from
a set of users blocked for violating Wikipedia’s policy on
personal attacks, sampling five comments per user shortly
before they were blocked. These were given to a group
of annotators, who were asked if each comment contains a
personal attack or harassment, whether it is targeted at the
recipient or a third party, if it is being reported or quoted, and
if it is another kind of attack or harassment. Data quality was
assured by requiring that each annotator label ten test com-
ments, and quality control comments were also inserted during
the annotation process. Each comment was annotated by ten
separate annotators. This resulted in a corpus5 of 115,859
comments, of which 13,590 were found to contain personal
attack or harassment. We should note that there is an overlap
between the training set of the toxic comment classification
competition and test set of this dataset. After the competition
launched, its organizers realized that some of their test corpus
was included in this dataset6. They corrected the problem by
moving these messages to their training corpus, which solved
the issue of getting a high score in the competition through
overfitting, but left the overlap in place.
III. DATASET VOCABULARY COMPARISON
The eight datasets we selected were collected from plat-
forms with different messaging formats, from limited-length
tweets to question-answer pairs to forum conversations. They
all pertain to some aspects of cyberbullying [2], although only
[6] explicitly names it as such and the problematic behaviors
they monitor varies greatly, from the focused scope of the
Twitter corpora to the wide range of behaviors labeled in the
5https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4054689.v6
6https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge/
discussion/46177
TABLE I
NUMBER OF MESSAGES, UNIQUE WORDS, AND TOTAL WORD COUNT IN
EACH DATASET
Dataset Messages Unique words Total words
A− 3,002 10,989 34,606
A+ 14,841 23,193 155,359
B− 7,957 15,153 73,973
B+ 3,627 9,531 40,027
C− 8,619 14,445 104,946
C+ 556 2,554 8,049
D− 2,898 13,195 56,848
D+ 1,049 4,377 13,183
E− 7,002 12,468 61,023
E+ 877 3,706 10,273
F− 114,677 162,524 4,410,757
F+ 12,979 32,001 398,342
G− 1,358,749 284,164 38,232,678
G+ 85,150 63,441 2,032,318
H− 49,155 99,083 1,983,200
H+ 6,463 21,748 235,820
Kaggle datasets. Some behaviors are common; hate speech
is explicitly labelled in five of the eight datasets. And some
behaviors are unique to some corpora; threats are explicitly
noted in only two corpora and sexually-explicit comments
in one. This wide variety of forms of cyberbullying and its
consequences are the main focus of our study.
To begin, we will study the impact of this diversity on
the vocabulary of the datasets using both traditional cosine
similarity and word embeddings First, we divide each dataset
into its positive and negative portions and treat each as a
separate dataset. Basic statistics are given in Table I. In this
table, the dataset letters refer to the subsections of Section II,
and the subscript + and - to the positive and negative class.
To compute cosine similarity, we convert each dataset into
its bag-of-word representation and compute the TFIDF value
of each word using the standard formula:
tfidf(w, d) = (1 + log nw,d)× log D
Dw
(1)
where the tfidf value of word w in dataset d is the log
normalization of the number of times the word occurs in the
dataset (nw,d) times the inverse log of the number of datasets
D (16 since we handle the positive and negative class of
each dataset separately here) and Dw the number of datasets
containing word w. Using the log normalization of the word
count (defined as 0 if a word does not occur in a corpus)
instead of using the word count directly helps mitigate the
impact of the extreme difference in the size of our datasets
shown in table I, by focusing on the order of magnitude of the
counts instead of their values. Once each dataset is represented
by its TFIDF-weighted word vector, we compute the cosine
similarity between each pair of dataset:
cos(A,B) =
A ·B
‖A‖ · ‖B‖ (2)
where A and B are the word vectors of two datasets. The
cosine similarity is a vector distance metric in the vocabulary
space, ranging from 0 for two completely different vectors to
1 for two identical vectors. Measuring this for each pair of our
16 classes gives the results presented in table II. These results
show that, for 6 of the 8 datasets, the most similar dataset
to its positive class is its negative class and vice-versa. The
two exceptions are datasets F and H, where the negative and
positive class of each is twice as similar to the negative and
positive class of the other than to its own complementary class.
Since both of these datasets were constructed from Wikipedia
talk page comments, this similarity is not surprising. The
similarity between the positive and negative class of dataset G
is a lot higher than the similarity between the classes of other
datasets, but this can be explained by the fact this dataset
comes from news comments and so its conversations were
constrained to news topics and vocabulary, unlike the other
corpora in which users could discuss any topic at all.
In fact, what is surprising in table III is not the similarities
we find, but how few of them we find. Datasets A, B, C, D
and E have nearly no similarity to any other dataset. Datasets
A and B, both from Twitter, have no more similarity to each
other than they do to datasets from other sources. Likewise,
the positive classes of datasets A and E, both focusing on
hate speech, have no more in common than they do to other
datasets, positive or negative. Even the similarity between
the positive and negative class of each dataset is rather low.
Normally we would expect language to be homogeneous
throughout a dataset and to vary mainly on the presence or
absence of class-specific cyberbullying keywords, and since
those would be a minority of the words used the similarity
between the positive and negative classes should be high. The
low values observed indicate the opposite, that the positive
and negative classes of each dataset differ also on the non-
cyberbullying vocabulary used. Finally, the low similarity
between the positive classes of different datasets shows that
the vocabulary marking cyberbullying is very different from
one dataset to the next. This can be attributed in part to the
different cyberbullying behaviors each dataset measures and to
the wildly different platforms each dataset was collected from,
and of course to the diversity and flexibility of the English
language. The consequence, however, is that we should expect
a system trained to recognize cyberbullying in one dataset to
have a lot of difficulty picking out cyberbullying in another.
Next, we select the 30 most important words of each
dataset class according to the TFIDF value, and get their word
embedding representation using FastText. While cosine sim-
ilarity considers exact word matches and word counts, word
embeddings highlights semantic similarity between different
words. We project these 300-dimensions word embeddings
onto a 2D map using the t-distributed stochastic neighbor
embedding (t-SNE) [12], a nonlinear dimensionality reduc-
tion technique which projects high-dimensional objects onto
a plane by mapping similar vectors to nearby points and
dissimilar vectors to distant points. This results in the graphical
representation of figure 1. The decision to limit ourselves to 30
words per class is simply to avoid overcrowding the graphic.
This representation of the 480 most significant words of our
datasets illustrates the vocabulary diversity problem mentioned
TABLE II
COSINE SIMILARITY BETWEEN EACH PAIR OF DATASETS
A− A+ B− B+ C− C+ D− D+ E− E+ F− F+ G− G+ H− H+
A− 1.000
A+ 0.212 1.000
B− 0.013 0.010 1.000
B+ 0.009 0.007 0.326 1.000
C− 0.014 0.027 0.011 0.006 1.000
C+ 0.005 0.016 0.003 0.002 0.188 1.000
D− 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.004 1.000
D+ 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.249 1.000
E− 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.003 0.024 0.013 1.000
E+ 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.015 0.016 0.094 1.000
F− 0.026 0.024 0.032 0.021 0.042 0.010 0.048 0.023 0.074 0.032 1.000
F+ 0.024 0.029 0.033 0.024 0.041 0.018 0.048 0.037 0.066 0.038 0.274 1.000
G− 0.030 0.030 0.035 0.022 0.048 0.012 0.052 0.025 0.067 0.032 0.284 0.151 1.000
G+ 0.036 0.036 0.046 0.034 0.051 0.013 0.074 0.042 0.085 0.049 0.276 0.206 0.545 1.000
H− 0.026 0.024 0.036 0.024 0.042 0.010 0.051 0.024 0.083 0.038 0.519 0.301 0.258 0.283 1.000
H+ 0.021 0.024 0.031 0.022 0.035 0.015 0.042 0.032 0.062 0.036 0.228 0.510 0.126 0.182 0.303 1.000
earlier. We do observe some small homogeneous regions,
mostly on the edges of the figure, where positive or negative
words of several datasets cluster near each other. These regions
represent words of similar meaning labeled in the same class in
different datasets. Ideally we would want the entire graphic to
have regions for words of clearly safe meaning and for words
of clearly cyberbullying intent agreed upon by all datasets.
However, most of the graphic is a large heterogeneous zone,
with words of similar meanings labeled in the positive class
in one dataset and the negative class in another. These are
neutral-meaning words that appear in only one class of a
dataset, and thus become significant indicators of that class.
Figure 1 shows that this is very frequently the case. Combined
with our previous observation on cosine similarity, this further
highlights the difficulty of transferring a cyberbullying detector
trained on one dataset to another. Not only is there little
agreement on how to define cyberbullying and very little
vocabulary in common between datasets, but words with
similar meanings are labeled in contradictory ways.
Fig. 1. t-SNE projection of the top 30 words of the positive and negative
class of each dataset.
IV. GENERALIZATION EXPERIMENT
In this first experiment, we explore the generalization power
of a cyberbullying detector trained on any one of the datasets
of section II to the other datasets. This is an important result
to document: while every one of the datasets has been used to
train detectors that perform very well on a test corpus subset
of itself, experiments on other datasets are more rare in the
literature, and when done [2], [5], [13] they do not explore
the limitations of this transfer in great depth. Moreover, it is
a result of immense real-world consequence. Publications in
online communities are very heterogeneous in style, content,
and acceptability standards, as our sample of datasets has
shown. Establishing the portability of a cyberbullying detector
trained for one community is thus very important.
A. Model and Training
Each message of a dataset is preprocessed by lowercasing
and tokenizing using the NLTK library7. We use sequence
bucketing, a technique that consists of padding the messages
to match the longest message of a batch (a set of 128 messages
in our case) instead of truncating or padding the entire dataset
to a fixed length, which would result in either memory waste
(if there are a few very long messages) or lost information (if
longer messages are truncated). We use a FastText network
pre-trained on Common Crawl data featuring 300 dimensions
and 2 million word vectors with subword information8 to
convert the words into vector representations. These vectors
are then concatenated with a 60-dimensional binary vector
representing 60 common characters; each character appearing
in a word is marked as a 1 in this vector. This makes the
system more robust to misspellings and typos (which are very
common online): a word that is a misspelling of another may
be a distant vector in word embedding space, but it will be
nearby in character space. This is an idea lifted from [14].
There exists many deep neural network architectures trained
for cyberbullying detection. For our experiments, getting state-
7https://www.nltk.org/
8https://github.com/facebookresearch/fastText
of-the-art results is not as important as getting comparable
results on all datasets that will allow us to contrast their
strengths and weaknesses. We thus opted for an attention
bidirectional long-term-short-term model. This model features
two bidirectional LSTM layer of 128 hidden units each,
followed by a scaled-dot product attention, global max and
average pooling layers, and finally three linear layers the
size of the concatenated pooling and attention layers. We use
layer normalization on the input, after the two bidirectional
LSTM layers, and after the attention layer. We perform
dropout after the initial layer normalization and before the
last linear layer. The activation function is the gaussian error
linear units (GELUs) [15]. The output of our model is a
probability distribution over the positive and negative classes,
to which we apply a softmax function. This architecture has
been proven to give good results in previous works [5] and
in practice in cyberbullying Kaggle competitions [9], [10].
Compared to other state-of-the-art architectures, such as BERT
or transformers, it has slightly worse performance but is much
faster to train and less demanding in computational resources.
We train our model using the Fused Adam optimiser from
Nvidia’s Apex library9 and half-precision [16] to reduce train-
ing time. We use a learning rate of 0.05, a decaying gamma of
0.6 every epoch and cross-entropy loss. We use a batch size
of 128 messages and train on each dataset for 15 epochs.
B. Results and Analysis
We present in tables III and IV the precision and recall
performance of our model when trained using each of our
training and validation datasets and tested on each of our
datasets. These two metrics are the most important ones to
optimize for cyberbullying detection: an ideal cyberbullying
filter will block all cyberbullying messages and no messages
that are not cyberbullying. Precision is the proportion of
messages classified as the positive class that actually belong
to it, and recall is the proportion of positive-class messages
that are detected as such. While the F1-score combines both
metrics, the averaging masks the performance details.
As expected, we find that classifiers trained on each dataset
have wildly varying performances on other test datasets, and
can see their precision or recall drop by as much as 0.8.
However, the results are far from uniformly bad. The top-
performing classifier on each test dataset (marked in bold in
the tables) is not always the one trained on it, and some
classifiers perform as well or even better on other datasets
compared to their own test dataset. This means that some gen-
eralization of cyberbullying detection is possible. Interestingly,
good candidates for generalization are not related to similar
data sources: datasets A and B both come from Twitter and
datasets F and H both come from Wikipedia talk pages, and
while the classifier trained on dataset B does perform better
on dataset A than others, the other three show no special
affinity for their similar datasets. Likewise, modeling a similar
behavior of cyberbullying does not guarantee generalization:
9https://github.com/NVIDIA/apex
datasets A and E both focus on hate speech, yet they each have
very poor recall on the other’s test set, meaning they cannot
accurately recognize messages the other labels as hate speech.
Looking at table III, we can see that every model achieves
an average precision between 0.45 and 0.63, meaning half the
messages each one labels as positive class actually belongs to
the negative class. This is a direct consequence of the problem
described by the word vectors in section III and illustrated in
figure 1: a lot of neutral words with similar meanings are
observed in multiple datasets but in the positive class of one
and the negative class of the other. When such words occur
in the training set of one dataset and the test set of another, it
causes the test message to be misclassified.
Looking next at recall results, we can see that classifiers
often perform worse on other datasets. This is especially true
for the classifiers trained on datasets B, C, D, and E; each of
them picks out less than half the positive messages on average
across datasets. These are also our four smallest datasets, with
less than 15,000 messages each and limited vocabulary in
I. The limited variety of messages they have been trained
on, compounded by the differences between datasets shown
in section III, means filters trained on these datasets cannot
generalize to new situations. By contrast, datasets F and
G achieve the highest recall scores, and are able to pick
out positive-class messages in other datasets despite their
differences. These are also the two largest datasets, and the
two that label the largest range of cyberbullying behaviors
(six each, compared to one or two in other datasets). Having
seen a greater variety of cyberbullying messages has allowed
them to generalize better to new datasets.
Looking at performance across test datasets, we find that
dataset A is the one where systems perform the best: all
models achieve their highest precision on it, and all but two
models achieving better than 0.5 recall. This is because it is
the only dataset imbalanced in favour of the positive class.
This makes the classification task easier; classifiers can be less
discriminating while still avoiding mislabeling negative-class
messages in this dataset in a way they cannot in other datasets
where positive-class messages are a rare exception. Every
classifier achieves a significantly lower precision on every
other dataset, including the one it is trained for, indicating
that all classifiers routinely mislabel negative-class messages
as positive class in all datasets except in dataset A where
negative-class messages are just too rare. On the other hand,
models achieve most of the lowest precision and recall scores
on dataset E. In fact, aside from the model trained specifically
on dataset E, every model has trouble with that dataset, with
on average only one-third of labeled messages being actually
positive-class and one-sixth of positive-class messages being
identified as such. This is likely due to that dataset’s narrow
definition, combined with the nature of the source. Dataset E
includes a clear intent to attack in the definition of its positive
class, and thus has messages with off-hand racial slurs labeled
as negative-class due to lack of intent but picked out as positive
class by other systems. However, dataset D also requires
intent in its positive class, and does not suffer from the same
problem. But dataset D was collected from an ordinary social
network, while dataset E was collected from Stormfront, a
white-supremacist and neo-nazi community. It is not surprising
that this dataset includes a lot more negative-class messages
with casually aggressive and hateful language that corresponds
to positive-class messages of other communities and causes a
low precision. The low recall is due to the fact that many of its
positive-class messages use racist imagery and idioms, such as
attacking people by saying they have ”African blood” in them,
rather than explicit hate-speech vocabulary.
TABLE III
CROSS-DATASET PRECISION
Test dataset
A B C D E F G H
A 0.98 0.57 0.31 0.53 0.27 0.56 0.48 0.77
B 0.96 0.77 0.27 0.35 0.22 0.44 0.23 0.43
C 0.99 0.69 0.53 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.47 0.87
D 0.97 0.45 0.19 0.75 0.19 0.59 0.38 0.77
E 0.97 0.72 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.49 0.24 0.64
F 0.95 0.51 0.21 0.51 0.36 0.51 0.62 0.77
G 0.97 0.52 0.30 0.55 0.37 0.58 0.80 0.81
H 0.98 0.43 0.26 0.56 0.23 0.61 0.68 0.84
TABLE IV
CROSS-DATASET RECALL
Test dataset
A B C D E F G H
A 0.98 0.21 0.65 0.67 0.17 0.65 0.14 0.63
B 0.53 0.78 0.25 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.11
C 0.63 0.17 0.57 0.68 0.06 0.47 0.12 0.47
D 0.44 0.10 0.68 0.70 0.10 0.48 0.20 0.53
E 0.15 0.07 0.28 0.24 0.60 0.19 0.24 0.17
F 0.93 0.30 0.84 0.86 0.35 0.93 0.49 0.86
G 0.81 0.25 0.74 0.79 0.37 0.89 0.57 0.76
H 0.75 0.15 0.78 0.82 0.11 0.79 0.30 0.77
C. Performance in relation to similarity between datasets
In figure 2, we consider each of our eight classifiers when
tested on each of the eight datasets. The color of each of
the 64 points indicates which dataset it was trained on, and
its X and Y position indicates the cosine similarity between
the pairs of positive and negative class datasets from table
2. The Z axis measures the Area Under Curve (AUC) of
the test, or the probability of ranking a randomly-chosen
positive message higher in positive class than a negative
message. Taken together, the figure plots the confidence of
the classification given the dataset similarity.
We can see three clusters of points in figure 2: a tight group
near the (0,0) cosine similarity, one at (1,1) similarity, and a
scattering of intermediate points. The cluster at similarity (1,1)
contains the eight points where a classifier is trained and tested
on the same dataset. That cluster has the best AUC points,
since every classifier is optimized to its dataset. The scatter
of six intermediate points are for classifiers trained on one of
datasets F, G and H and tested on each of the other two. As
shown in table 2, these datasets are the most similar to each
Fig. 2. AUC of each test given the cosine similarity of the positive and
negative datasets.
other, and this figure shows their AUC rivals that of the (1,1)
cluster. Even a limited similarity between the language used
in two datasets allows a classifier trained on one to perform
well on the other. Finally, all other test results, 50 of our 64
points, are in the (0,0) cluster. These points cover the largest
range of performances, from an AUC of 0.55 (almost random
chance classification) to 0.95 (surpassing the lower half of the
other two clusters). There is no coherence between datasets:
the classifiers trained on datasets B and D have the worst
AUC performances but also sometimes perform in the low-
0.8 range, and classifiers trained on datasets F, G and H get
some of the best results but also sometimes perform in the
high-0.6 AUC range. Given low similarity between datasets,
the performance of a classifier trained on one when applied
to the other could be almost anything, and is unpredictable.
Given that low similarity is the norm, this further highlights
the unreliability of transferring a pre-trained cyberbullying
classifier to a new community.
V. ENSEMBLE EXPERIMENTS
If it is difficult to use a cyberbullying detector trained on
one corpus to detect problem messages in another, we can
wonder if it would be possible to combine a set of detectors,
each trained on a different corpus, into an accurate general-
domain detector. To explore this question, in this section we
will compare together different ensemble model architectures
built from our individual models.
A. Ensemble Models
We implemented five ensemble models that combine our
existing classifiers in different ways without retraining them.
1) Linear layer (LL): In this model, the outputs of the
eight individual classifiers (after the softmax function) are
combined in a linear layer. This layer is trained using the
same hyperparameters as the individual models, and a dropout
before the linear layer ensures it does not overfit to a single
model’s decision.
2) Democratic voting (DV): Many of the datasets are
labeled independently by multiple annotators, and receive the
labels chosen by the majority. We sought to replicate this logic
in this ensemble model. Each of our eight classifiers casts a
vote based on its classification of a message, and the winning
class is simply the one with the most votes.
3) Sum voting (SV): This is a variation of the DV model
that takes into account the varying levels of confidence of
each model. Instead of an all-or-nothing vote for one class,
each classifier votes for both the negative and positive class
with the probability it assigns to each class after the softmax
function. A classifier that is confident in its result will cast a
strong vote for that class while one that is uncertain will cast
almost equal votes for both classes and have little influence
on the final decision; however, several weak votes in one class
may still overrule a single strong vote in the other.
4) Maximum wins (MW): This ensemble model picks the
classifier with the maximum confidence in its output and
assigns the message to its class.
5) Thresholding: In this ensemble model, if any one of the
eight classifiers identifies a message as positive class with a
confidence above a threshold, it is labeled as such regardless of
the output of the other seven classifiers. We implemented two
variations of this classifier, one with the confidence threshold
at 0.5 (T0.5), which is the lowest possible confidence for
a classifier to assign a message to the positive class. The
other uses a threshold of 0.95 (T0.95), and if no classifier
marks a message as positive with that confidence threshold the
ensemble defaults to MW. The first version will thus represent
extreme paranoia, where the slightest hint of cyberbullying
marks a message as positive class, and the other is a paranoid
version of MW.
6) Dataset merger (DM): As a baseline, we merged to-
gether all eight datasets and trained a new classifier on this
dataset, using the training details as in section IV.
B. Results and Analysis
Tables V and VI give the precision and recall value of
each ensemble technique when applied to each of our test
datasets. Compared to tables III and IV, we can see the
ensemble models have generally better precision and worse
recall. The F1-scores, which are not given due to space
limitations but can be computed from the precision and recall
values, of the ensemble models are comparable or better to
those of the individual classifiers. This means that combining
the information individual classifiers learned from training on
different datasets improves the overall performances.
Looking at the performance of individual classifiers, we can
see that the three voting classifiers (DV, SV and MW) have
similar behaviors: they achieve some of the best precision
scores and worst recall scores of all systems. This indicates
that most classifiers mislabel most positive-class messages:
either those messages have features of the negative class or
they lack features of the positive class each classifier is trained
for, or both. As a result, when the ensemble decides a message
belongs in the positive class, it is usually right. However, most
positive-class messages are only recognized by a minority of
or low-confidence classifiers, and thus recall is low.
The LL ensemble also combines the outputs of the eight
classifiers, but using a linear layer trained to weight their
individual outputs and optimize the decision. It achieves
slightly worse precision but much better recall than the DV,
SV and MW models. It thus behaves in the opposite manner:
it catches a lot more positive-class messages, but mislabels a
few more negative-class messages as well. Comparing to the
results of section IV, LL actually outperforms all but one of
the individual classifiers in precision and in recall and all of
them in F1-score, again confirming that there is knowledge to
be gained by combining the classifiers.
The paranoid T0.5 model achieves the top recall and lowest
precision scores by wide margins. This means that most
positive-class messages are labeled as such by at least one
classifier, but so are a lot of negative-class messages. If used
in practice, this system would create a very clean commu-
nity mostly devoid of cyberbullying, but would also strongly
restrict legitimate conversations. By increasing the decision
threshold, T0.95 limits its positive class to messages any one
classifier gets a strong signal from. This increases precision in
all tests, as mildly positive messages are no longer marked in
the positive class. However, the recall value decreases sharply
compared to the T0.5 result, indicating that there are a lot
of positive-class messages that not a single classifier can
confidently recognize. Interestingly, the performance of T0.95
seems closer to LL than to T0.5.
Interestingly, the DM approach seems to give the best
overall performance. It surpasses LL and T0.95 in precision
and is second only to T0.5 in recall, and while it does not
match DV, SV and MW in precision it is only 0.04 behind
them without suffering from a drop in recall like they do. In
terms of F1-score, it is also our best classifier. This means
that the best way to combine the information from multiple
datasets is not by combining multiple individual classifiers
but by combining all datasets into a single classifier. This
empirical conclusion stems also from our earlier analysis in
section IV, where we saw that diversity of language use and of
cyberbullying behaviors was key to achieving good results, and
similarity of language was important for generalization of the
system. By combining all datasets together, the DM classifier
is necessarily trained on the largest possible vocabulary and
the largest set of different behaviors, and will have vocabulary
similarity to all datasets. Moreover, this merger will neutralize
the problem exposed in figure 1, of having similar neutral-
meaning words that appear only in the vocabulary of the
positive class in one dataset and of the negative class in the
other and thus confuse the classification. After the merger,
these words appear in both classes in the unified dataset and
no longer have a strong influence the classification.
TABLE V
ENSEMBLE MODELS PRECISION
Test dataset
A B C D E F G H
LL 0.97 0.56 0.28 0.55 0.38 0.59 0.82 0.82
DV 0.99 0.63 0.45 0.68 0.30 0.78 0.87 0.93
SV 0.99 0.57 0.40 0.62 0.41 0.75 0.89 0.93
MW 0.99 0.65 0.35 0.60 0.46 0.72 0.89 0.91
T0.5 0.93 0.62 0.14 0.44 0.31 0.40 0.33 0.58
T0.95 0.98 0.70 0.32 0.57 0.37 0.60 0.82 0.82
DM 0.98 0.72 0.35 0.63 0.40 0.58 0.81 0.83
TABLE VI
ENSEMBLE MODELS RECALL
Test dataset
A B C D E F G H
LL 0.87 0.30 0.78 0.82 0.29 0.91 0.50 0.78
DV 0.69 0.14 0.66 0.69 0.07 0.52 0.11 0.52
SV 0.78 0.17 0.69 0.74 0.12 0.63 0.16 0.62
MW 0.87 0.27 0.65 0.67 0.11 0.58 0.163 0.57
T0.5 0.99 0.83 0.91 0.93 0.72 0.98 0.75 0.91
T0.95 0.96 0.47 0.78 0.78 0.18 0.84 0.32 0.75
DM 0.98 0.74 0.65 0.77 0.38 0.89 0.54 0.82
VI. CONCLUSION
The fight against cyberbullying is a challenge of major
social importance, and many datasets labeling behaviors as-
sociated with cyberbullying are available online to help train
filters. In this paper, we conducted an in-depth study of the
relationship between eight of these datasets and the systems
that can be trained from them. First, we studied the datasets
themselves, and what they tell us about cyberbullying behav-
iors. Next we studied the similarity in vocabulary between the
datasets. We then trained deep neural network systems on each
dataset and used them to study how they can be transferred
from one domain to another. Finally, we studied approaches
for combining the classifiers into ensemble models.
Our paper has highlighted four major conclusions. First,
there is little agreement on the definition of cyberbullying,
the behaviors that comprise it, or how to measure and label
them. For instance, hate speech is a recurring behavior in
several datasets, but its precise definition varies so much
than a classifier trained on one hate-speech dataset fails to
pick it up in the others. Our second conclusion is that there
is very little language in common between datasets, and
what there is is often labeled in contradictory ways, which
makes transferring systems difficult. In practice, this means a
cyberbullying filter built for one community cannot be easily
applied on another. Our third conclusion is that the condition
to facilitate transferability is to have a system trained on as
diverse a dataset as possible, both in terms of language use
and in terms of behaviors labeled. This leads into our last
conclusion, that if one wishes to combine the knowledge from
different datasets in a unified system, the best way of doing
this is to merge the datasets and train a single system.
However, merging multiple datasets does not solve the
underlying problem, the limited vocabulary of the datasets
which leads to neutral words being observed exclusively
in one class and becoming false classification signals. No
additions to the dataset can completely solve that problem. Our
future work will focus on an alternative solution, namely data
augmentation. By replacing words in the messages by nearby
words in word-embedding space, we could create a dataset
that more thoroughly explores the vocabulary space. These
synonyms would bridge the language gap between neutral
words seen only in one class, and also create a vocabulary
buffer around true positive or negative words and strengthen
their predictive power. To preserve the meaning of the message
in this enhancement step, we will use a context-based word
embedding architecture such as the skipgram architecture [17].
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